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Abstract
ThePrecautionaryPrinciplehasprovidedthefoundationsforbuildinganewriskregulatorypatternunderscientiﬁc
uncertainty. This paper investigates how classical economic theory may, or may not, justify the Precautionary
Principle. It examines the link between irreversibility, the prospect of increasing information over time and risk
management.Indoingso,itbringscloserthenotionofoptionvaluetothatofprecaution.Usingageneralmodelling
framework, it identiﬁes the conditions so that the Precautionary Principle is an efﬁcient economic guideline. It
also explains why precautionary policies are not likely to emerge in a competitive economy or in the presence of
a global pollution problem.
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1. Introduction
AsrecentlyillustratedbythebeefcrisisinEuropeorbythedebatesongeneticmanipulations,
the Precautionary Principle (PP) is becoming increasingly prominent in the environmental
protection and health safety debate. The basic premise of the PP is that one should not
wait for conclusive evidence of a risk before putting control measures in place designed to
protect the environment or consumers.
Despite the seemingly clear meaning of this premise, the question of how to interpret
the PP has engendered endless controversies. There is no single accepted interpretation of
the PP.1 In its most extreme formulation, the PP requires absolute proof of safety before
allowing innovations to be adopted. Its various interpretations has been the source of inter-
national tensions between the US and the European Union, as in the hormone-treated beef
affair for example. A critical editorial in the Wall Street Journal has said that the “PP is
an environmentalist neologism, invoked to trump scientiﬁc evidence and move directly to
banning things they don’t like—biotech, wireless technology, hydrocarbon emissions.”
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of risk management under conditions of scientiﬁc uncertainty. For the sake of illustration,
research on policies for limiting climate change due to greenhouse gases emissions have
emphasized the need to develop such a sequential approach to decision-making. The choice
between a moderate or an aggressive emissions reduction is determined today by the future
improvement of scientiﬁc understanding of climate change and by our ability to switch to
other sources of energy in the future.
Yet, economists have not been waiting till we face the global warming issue to think
about decision-making under conditions of evolving knowledge. In 1974, Kenneth Arrow
andAnthonyFisherexaminedtheeffectoflearningmoreovertimeaboutuncertainbeneﬁts
of preserving an area of wilderness land when its development would be irreversible. They
identiﬁedanadditional(quasi-)optionvaluethatraisestheopportunitycostofdevelopment
due to the prospect of forthcoming information. The same year, Claude Henry proved that
taking account of forthcoming information together with the irreversible nature of most
investment decisions prevents the use of the net present value method. This insight was
applied to the valuation of irreversible investment projects in France, such as developing a
circumferential highway around Paris over forests or ancestral properties.
Given the prominent literature on the PP in social sciences in general,2 the purpose of the
paperisthustodevelopacoherentviewoftheeconomicapproachofthePP.Webuildonthe
option value literature to provide an interpretation of the PP, that, we believe, is shared by
most economists. In short, we consider a sequential framework and examine the conditions
so that scientiﬁc uncertainties lead to a more precautionary rule in the short-run. In doing
so, the paper also summarizes recent research of the option value literature and points out
the strengths of this approach as well as its limits in order to raise some promising research
trends.3 In particular, this paper discusses various implementation issues raised by the PP.
We organize this paper as follows. In the Section 2, we shall begin by stressing some
typical features of new technological or environmental risks. We argue that the interplay
among those features suggest to develop sequential regulatory policies. This will permit to
adapt future decisions to scientiﬁc progress. We then introduce the PP as a new guideline
that appeared in international treaties in the early 90s.
In Section 3, with the help of a simple example, we introduce the theory of sequential
decision-making (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). We bring closer the
notion of option value to that of precaution. We set up the general model and deﬁne the
notions of information structures and that of irreversibility. We also make use of that model
to distinguish the notion of precaution from that of prevention.
In Section 4, we examine the interplay between information and ﬂexibility. We demon-
stratethattheprospectofforthcominginformationalwaysbiasesdecisionsinfavorofmore
ﬂexibility (Epstein, 1980). In doing so, this paper presents in a summary fashion the lit-
erature on the ‘irreversibility effect’ in order to integrate the most recent developments in
investment theory and its interactions with environment policy. In particular, we show that
when long-term effects of risks are unknown, it may be optimal to be more prudent at the
initial stage of the risk management process. This allows us to put forward a normative
economic basis for the PP (Gollier, Jullien, and Treich, 2000).
In Section 5, we show that the results derived from the literature on option values may
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illustrations of such market failures. We discuss the strength of competition in innovative
markets, the effect of time-inconsistencies and that of global environmental externalities.
For these three illustrations, we show that decision-makers may not select precautionary
policies at the equilibrium, while these policies should be adopted in the global economy.
There is thus a need to implement the PP by designing appropriate regulatory policies
together with the suitable institutions to enforce these policies.
InSection6,weconcludethepaperbyabroaderdiscussiononriskregulatoryinstitutions.
We argue that scientiﬁc uncertainty introduces a considerable room for discretion and
self-interested biases through the channels of risk management. Experts may more easily
provide biased recommendations. Politicians may rely more easily on the scientiﬁc theory
that matches their interests. Liability rules are more difﬁcult to set up due to imperfect
knowledge and the long run effects in presence. Also, scientiﬁc uncertainty may enhance
public misperceptions. The presence of scientiﬁc uncertainty thus drastically complicates
the decision-making process. The challenge then will be to design the PP to reduce the
opportunism of some agents in situation of imperfect and changing risk information.
2. A new guideline for regulating new risks
The perception of risks has profoundly changed in the last three decades. As illustrated by
the development of cancers from abestos, by the drama of contaminated blood transmitting
AIDS, or by the recent ‘mad cow affair’, damages generated by decisions taken under
scientiﬁcuncertaintymayaffectmillionsofpeoplewithwideregionalvariations.Examples
abound of risks sharing those characteristics: hazardous wastes, species extinction, global
warming, electromagnetic ﬁelds, cellular phones, transgenic food; and the list could go
on. Analysis of regulatory policies to deal with those new risks is complicated by several
features.
First,theconsequencesmayariseinatime-spanofseveraldecadestocenturies.Typically
damages are generated by the stock of pollutants present in the environment, rather than by
itsﬂowwhichcanbecontrolledmoreeasily.Theconcentrationofthepollutantcanrespond
only slowly to the change in the annual rate of emission. As a result, one cannot readily
reverse or mitigate physical degradation other than letting the natural rate of decay operate.
The Montr´ eal protocol, establishing a schedule to reduce the consumption of CFCs and
halons, was signed as of March 1987. Yet, one will have to wait until the end of this new
centuryfortherateofchlorinetobelowerthanitslevelof1970.Inthissense,pastdecisions
to emit pollutants will have some strong impact on the risk borne by future generations.
In addition to this inertia linked to physical processes, there exist more radical types of
irreversibility.Forinstance,theCreutzfeldt-Jakobdisease,thatmayresultfromeating‘mad
cows,isirreversible.Thelossofsomeanimalspeciesduetoclimatechangeorthediffusion
of some genetically modiﬁed species may also be readily irreversible. Another kind of
irreversibility comes from the time needed for adaptation of the socio-economic system.
Rapid changes in the turnover of capital imply higher costs than a smooth adaptation,
as the time necessary for developing low-cost substitutes of the pollutants. This time lag
will involve further complications related to technical changes as well as population and
consumption patterns.80 GOLLIER AND TREICH





problem. The interactions between atmosphere, clouds, oceans and polar ice sheets are still
not well understood. IPCC (1995) estimated that for a doubling atmospheric concentration
of carbon dioxide the increase in the temperature may lie between +1.8◦C and +5.4◦C.
This represents a considerable scientiﬁc uncertainty.
However, while at ﬁrst uncertainty may loom very large, there is high potential for rapid
resolution of uncertainty. There is ongoing research on these new risks. Recall that in the
1960s, ozone alarms began with an attack against supersonic ﬂights, wrongly suspected by
some US scientists to deplete ozone layer. In 1974, Molina and Rowland published their
famous theory in Nature. Then, in the fall 1985, two teams of scientists discovered the
ozone hole over the antarctic.
To sum up, decision-making related to new environmental or technological risks must
take into account these important characteristics of the problem: long time horizon, stock
externalities, possible irreversibilities (physical and socio-economic), large uncertainties
and future scientiﬁc progress.
Asopposedtovariousformsofregularriskscommonlyaddressedbystandardprevention
or insurance activities, the interplay among those characteristics has emphasized the need
to develop dynamic approaches to regulation strategies. Timing becomes the key issue.
This underlies the need to identify optimal short-term strategies in the face of long-term
uncertainties. These strategies should permit to respond to new information with mid-
course corrections. As a result, “[preventing] measures should be periodically reviewed in
the light of scientiﬁc progress, and amended as necessary” (CEC, 2000). The advantages of
a so-called sequential approach has been often advocated as a strategy for abating climate
change (Hammitt, Lempert, and Schlesinger, 1992). For instance, IPCC (1995) states that
“the challenge is not to ﬁnd the best policy today for the next 100 years, but to select a
prudent and ﬂexible strategy and to adjust it over time.”
The economic approach may then be of signiﬁcant help. Considerable work has been
done in economic theory on the question of uncertainty and learning. The economic cri-
teria of decision-making under uncertainty potentially permit to select among the various
scientiﬁc experts’ scenarios. As an illustration, Manne and Richels (1992) or Nordhaus
(1994) combined Ramsey growth economic models together with elaborated climatic mod-
ules. Those “integrated assessment” models have identiﬁed optimal climate policies given
climatic uncertainties.
One of the difﬁculty to implement a sequential approach comes from the danger to
take decisions with a limited conﬁdence on the underlying mechanism generating the risk
faced by the population. The costs of developing early preventive actions is often very high
compared to the do-nothing strategy, just waiting for better scientiﬁc evidence. Uncertainty
and irreversibility may precisely be used as an argument in favor of the status quo. For
instance,intheearly1980s,theAmericanChemistrySocietycomplainedthatanyrestriction
onCFCsreductionwouldconstitute“theﬁrstregulationtobebasedentirelyonanunveriﬁedDECISION-MAKING UNDER SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 81
scientiﬁc prediction.” A DuPont spokesperson protested that “we are going a very long way
into the regulatory process before scientists know what’s really going on” (Morone and
Woodhouse, 1986, p. 82).
The key point here is that there is a tension between the rapid resolution of uncertainty
and the slow entropy of the system, e.g. climate evolves slowly compared to rate of the
resolution of spatio-temporal climate models. As stated for instance by the IPCC (1995):
“The choice of abatement paths involves balancing the economic risks of rapid abatement
now (that premature capital stock retirement will later proved unnecessary) against the
corresponding risk of delay (that more rapid reduction will then be required, necessitating
premature retirement of future capital stock).”
In this context, the PP takes a committed stand against “learn-then-act,”“ wait-and-see”
or “business-as-usual” strategies and in favor of premature preventive actions. The PP has
its beginnings in the early 1970s as the German principle of Vorsorge, or foresight. The
PP was ﬁrst introduced in 1984 at the First International Conference on Protection of the
North Sea. It has then ﬂourished in international statements of policy, as in the Maastricht
Treaty, or at the Conference of Rio. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration states “Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall





the delay of measures preventing environmental degradation. The PP is the most notable
anticipatory principle existing in the national and international law with special relevance
for human-induced environmental problems. In practice, its scope is even much wider and
there are reasonable grounds for applying it to regulate the protection of human, animal
and plant health issues (CEC, 2000). Nowadays, this principle is often said to be the solid
foundation on which to base decision-making under conditions of large uncertainty (e.g.
Godard, 1997).
Yet, the PP cannot stand out through decrees or discussions only. Our objective is to
examine whether the PP is an efﬁcient economic guideline. Hence we will investigate in
the next section a sequential decision problem. As time passes, information about the true
scientiﬁc theory comes. We will examine optimal sequential policies, i.e. policies that are
robust to the timing of the resolution of scientiﬁc uncertainty. We will check whether these
policies induce a bias towards premature investments in prevention, as suggested by the PP.
3. Presentation of the framework
The previous section has presented the historical context in which the PP has emerged. We
have seen that since the ﬁrst environmental threats developed in the mid-70s the concept of
precaution has become increasingly prominent in environmental or health safety protection
debates.Interestingly,duringthesameperiod,economistshaveperformedanewtheoretical
approach to cost-beneﬁt analysis, stressing the irreversibility and the uncertainty inherent
to the future beneﬁts of development decisions (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). This option82 GOLLIER AND TREICH
value literature has then been developed intensively in the investment literature (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1984).
In this section, we will proceed as follows. We will ﬁrst introduce the notion of option
valuethroughasimpleexample.Wewillthensetupthegeneralmodelanddeﬁnethenotions
of irreversibility and that of information structure. We then make use of that framework to
formally distinguish the notion of prevention to that of precaution.
3.1. Option values: Introductory example
An economy of risk-neutral agents is considering the possibility of developing a wild area.
There is a once for all sunk cost I to implement the project. The beneﬁt from developing
the area is uncertain because the area might contain some rare species or some plant with
important medicine properties in the future. Given the current scientiﬁc uncertainty about
these future beneﬁts, the project’s expected beneﬁt for the Society per period is P. In fact,
therearetwocompetingtheorieswhichcanbetruewithequalprobabilitiesgivenourcurrent
beliefs.Butoneexpectsscientiﬁcprogresstobemadeovertheﬁrstperiodwhichwillreveal
the true theory and the corresponding true added value of the development project.5 With
equal probability it may rise to 1.5P or fall to 0.5P. The discount factor is β ∈ ]0, 1[. The
problem is to determine the optimal timing for developing the area.





since the project generates a cost I in the current period and an expected beneﬁt P in each
periodforever.TheclassicalmethodconsistsindevelopingtheprojectimmediatelyifNPV1
is positive. This, however, may not be optimal. An alternative decision rule would be to
decide whether or not to develop after the scientiﬁc uncertainty has been resolved. To make







so that the project is socially valuable only if the good theory is true. As a consequence,
conditionallyonthefactthatthedecisiontodevelopisdelayedintheﬁrstperiod,theproject
is developed in the second period if and only if the good theory is revealed to be the true









and only if NPV2 ≥ NPV1. There is a negative and a positive effect of delaying the project.
The negative effect comes from the loss of the initial expected value P. The beneﬁt comesDECISION-MAKING UNDER SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 83
fromtheopportunitytoabandontheprojectifthebadtheoryhappenstobethetrueone.This
is only when this beneﬁt is larger than the loss of the ﬁrst period cash-ﬂow that the option
is valuable. The quantity max(0,NPV2 − NPV1) is called the option value of delaying the
investment, which can be positive or zero. Thus, the decision of whether it is optimal to
invest in the ﬁrst period or to remain uncommitted depends upon the relative values of the
three parameters: P, I and β. Speciﬁcally, suppose as in the introductory example in Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) that these parameters take respectively 200, 1600 and 1/1.1. Then the
option value is equal to 173.
This positive option value reﬂects the cost of an irreversible decision: investing with no
possibility of “dis-investing”. Note that if the cost I was fully recoverable, then it would
be always optimal to invest in the ﬁrst period and then to recover this cost if one learns
that the project is not socially valuable. But a decision like the one of developing a wild
area is often very costly to reverse. This choice makes the future position inﬂexible. Yet
since the opportunity to develop is not a take-it-or-leave-it option, one may choose to do
nothing ﬁrst. By doing so, one keeps the option of developing later on. This ﬂexibility in
the decision process makes possible for the decision-maker to use the information to come,
which is valuable.
There is thus a trade-off between receiving the current period cash-ﬂow of the project
and waiting for the future scientiﬁc information arrival. This is the irreversible nature of
investment decisions together with the information value that is at the origin of the option
valueasﬁrstrecognizedbyArrowandFisher(1974)andHenry(1974a).6 Thisoptionvalue
provides a strong argument in favor of the PP, if it is interpreted as the idea that scientiﬁc
uncertainty should induce us to preserve ﬂexibility for the future.
3.2. The model
We now introduce a general model that includes the previous one. Our objective will be to
exhibit the general conditions that control the sensitiveness of the current decision to the
prospect of forthcoming information.
A decision-maker (DM) lives for two periods:
• Atthebeginningofperiodone,hemustchooseα1 withinanopportunityset D thataffects
his ﬁrst period utility u(α1);
• After decision α1 is made, he receives a message ˜ y = y. He revises his beliefs according
to the Bayes’rule;
• At the beginning of period 2, he takes another decision α2 within an opportunity set
D(α1);
• Finally the true state of the world ˜ θ = θ is revealed and the DM enjoys a discounted
felicity v(α1,α 2,θ).
The DM maximizes his lifetime expected utility:
max
α1∈D
u(α1) + βE ˜ y max
α2∈D(α1)
E ˜ θ/˜ yv(α1,α 2, ˜ θ). (4)84 GOLLIER AND TREICH
We assume that solutions of (4) exist and are unique.7 This model includes the introductory















and assume that θ may take 0.5 or 1.5 with equal probability.
In the example presented in the previous section, irreversibility may be represented as a
reduction of the future opportunity set implied by the ﬁrst period decision,
D(α1) ={ 0,1 − α1}. (7)
Inwords,takingaction“1”intheﬁrstperiodmeans“investing”.Then,thefutureopportunity
set would become D(1) ={ 0}, so that there is only one possible choice let for the future,
“no investing”. As a consequence, investing now kills the option of investing in the future.
This represents the fact that developing the project is ‘irreversible’. More generally, we will
say that decision α1 is more irreversible than α 
1 when
D(α1) ⊆ D(α 
1). (8)
This deﬁnition captures the notion of choice irreversibility. Undertaking an irreversible
action, such as the development of a wildland area results in a more inﬂexible position than
leavingtheareaundevelopedtodayandhavingthechoiceofthedevelopmentorpreservation
tomorrow.Inourframework,thischoiceisirreversiblesinceitwillreducethesetofchoices
D(α1) available later on.8 For instance, when the opportunity takes the form of a constraint
on period 2 decision, i.e. so that f1(α1) ≤ α2 ≤ f2(α1), larger α1 is more irreversible only
if f  
1(·) ≥ 0 and f  
2(·) ≤ 0.9
Let us now turn to another crucial question. As explained earlier, our aim is to determine
the impact of scientiﬁc uncertainty on the optimal timing of risk-taking. Scientiﬁc uncer-
tainty differs from natural risks by the fact that the ﬁrst is subject to be resolved over time,
at least partially. We will examine the effect of an increase in the scientiﬁc uncertainty. The
problem is thus to characterize more scientiﬁc uncertainty.
Wewillsaythatthereismorescientiﬁcuncertaintytodayifweexpectscientiﬁcresearchto
be more informative in the future, i.e. if we face a better information structure. We hereafter
present the concept of a better information structure introduced by Blackwell (1951).
It is convenient here to assume that ˜ θ is discrete with m atoms of probability. We then
denote πy(θi) for the probability that ˜ θ = θi conditional to receiving signal y and πy =
(πy(θ1),...,πy(θm)) (resp. π 
y ) the probability distribution conditional to the message y of
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In the standard terminology of Blackwell (1951), ˜ y in model (4) describes an “exper-
iment”, but what we have in mind is scientiﬁc research in general. We will consider the
following intuitive deﬁnition of a better experiment ﬁrst proposed by Bohenblust, Shapley,
and Sherman (1949). We say that the experiment ˜ y is better than experiment ˜ y  if and only
if every DM prefers a priori observing ˜ y than ˜ y :
E ˜ y max
α2∈D(α1)
E ˜ θ/˜ yv(α1,α 2, ˜ θ) ≥ E ˜ y  max
α2∈D(α1)
E ˜ θ/˜ y v(α1,α 2, ˜ θ), (9)
or equivalently,
E ˜ y j(α1,π˜ y) ≥ E ˜ y  j(α1,π 
˜ y ),




E ˜ θ/yv(α1,α 2, ˜ θ). (10)
Note that this function is convex in the vector of posterior probabilities since it is the
maximum of linear functions of πy. Importantly, this result holds independently of the
decision problem under consideration. Indeed by (10), function j is the upper envelop of a
set of functions f (α1,πy) = E ˜ θ/yv(α1,α 2, ˜ θ),α 1 ∈ D(α1), that are linear in πy. Therefore
it is a convex function of πy.
Reciprocally, one can prove that any convex function ρ(πy)o nS can be obtained from
the operation (10) when appropriately choosing the decision-making environment. This is
due to the well-known separating hyperplane theorem which implies that, to any convex
surface, there exists a set of hyperplanes for which this surface is the upper envelope.
Following Marschak and Miyasawa (1968), this leads to another equivalent deﬁnition of a
better information structure which will prove to be extremely useful in the rest of the paper.
Deﬁnition 1. Information structure ˜ y is better than information structure ˜ y  if and only if:
for any ρ convex on S : E ˜ yρ(π˜ y) ≥ E ˜ y ρ(π 
˜ y ). (11)
Note that (11) implies that the two economies have the same beliefs ex ante
E ˜ yπ˜ y = E ˜ y π 
˜ y .
Asaconsequence(11)deﬁnesamean-preservingspreadofposteriorbeliefs.Thismeansthat
the increase in scientiﬁc uncertainty is obtained without changing the ex ante distribution
of the real risk ˜ θ.Suppose for instance that there are two states of the world, m = 2 and
denote π ≡ π(θ1) for the prior belief on state 1. Then any convex function ρ(π)o n  is a
measure of information. Take for instance the inverse of the entropy function10
ρ(π) = π logπ + (1 − π)log(1 − π).86 GOLLIER AND TREICH
Entropy or uncertainty is maximal for π = 0.5 and minimal for 0 or 1. Any experiment that
will lead to move ex post probabilities away from π also diminish the ex ante uncertainty
faces by the DM.
3.3. Prevention versus precaution
Since Knight (1921) it is standard to make a distinction between a risk, characterized by
an objective probability distribution, and uncertainty, which is not related to any precise
statistical estimates. From this point of view, the previous model distinguishes the risk,
tied to the realizations of ˜ θ, from uncertainty tied to the realizations of ˜ y. Making this
distinction leads to recognizing that uncertainty is not independent of knowledge and thus
is not a static concept. With the accumulation of knowledge, uncertainty resolves, at least
partially, allowing for a revision of beliefs. Hence, we interpret the fact that the future
probability distribution π˜ y is unknown to the DM in the initial period as the lack of full
scientiﬁc certainty advocated by the PP. Initially the DM ignores both θ and y. There are
two sources of risk represented in the model. The second source of risk, tied to scientiﬁc
uncertainty ˜ y, is at the root of the precautionary motive.
What is the effect of scientiﬁc uncertainty on decision-making? Using deﬁnition (11),
we will answer this question in the sense of the comparative statics analysis. We consider
two economies ˜ y and ˜ y  that are equivalent except for the ﬂow of information, i.e., except
for the degree of scientiﬁc uncertainty. In which economy is it optimal to be more prudent
in the short run? The PP would get some theoretical support if it would be socially efﬁcient
to be more prudent in economy ˜ y with more scientiﬁc uncertainty. This would mean that
scientiﬁc uncertainty gives support to develop more intensive risk-reduction activities in
the short run. This is our interpretation of the idea of precaution.
This interpretation of the PP allows us to make a basic economic distinction between the
words prevention and precaution. A preventive effort reduces the risk on ˜ θ. It is a static
conceptthatreferstothemanagementofariskatagiventimeandgivenastableprobability
distribution. On the other hand precaution is tied to the notion of scientiﬁc uncertainty ˜ y.I t
isadynamicconceptthatrecognizesscientiﬁcprogressovertime.Aprecautionarymeasure
is thus a temporary and ﬂexible decision that is taken in face of the lack of current scientiﬁc
evidence. In short, while prevention aims at managing risks, precaution aims at managing
the wait for better scientiﬁc information.
4. An economic interpretation of the Precautionary Principle
In Section 3, we have introduced the notions of irreversibility and that of information value.
We will now examine the interplay between these two notions leading us to propose our
own interpretation of the PP based on the ‘irreversibility effect’. We proceed as follows. In
our general model, we will focus on the effect of information on ex ante decision. In doing
so, we examine how the structure of information about future risk is expected to affect the
optimaltimingofdecisions.Wethenconsideraspeciﬁcmodelwheretheonlylinkbetween
period1andperiod2decisionsisanirreversibilityconstraint.Thisyieldsan“irreversibilityDECISION-MAKING UNDER SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 87
effect”.W eﬁnally consider a broader model where the decision in period 1 also affects the
risk born in period 2. This yields another effect, coined the “precautionary effect”.
4.1. The comparative statics of more information
Consider model (4). Assume that the solutions to the ﬁrst period problem in economy ˜ y and
˜ y , respectively denoted α∗
1 and α∗ 
1 , are the unique solutions to the respective equations
E ˜ y j1(α∗
1,π˜ y) = 0 and E ˜ y  j1(α∗ 
1 ,π 
˜ y ) = 0, (12)
where j is the value function as deﬁned in (10), and j1 denotes its partial derivative with
respect to α1. It can then easily be checked that
α∗
1 ≥ α∗ 
1 ⇔ E ˜ y  j1(α∗
1,π 
˜ y ) ≤ 0.
So using (12) it is obvious that a better information structure increases optimal α1 when
E ˜ y j1(α∗




1 ∈ D. Inequality (11) gives then the following Lemma due to Epstein (1980).
This Lemma is very general since it imposes no restriction on the decision problem nor on
the random variables ˜ θ and ˜ y.
Lemma 1. Consider the general problem (4). The optimal level of the ex ante decision α1
is increased (resp. decreased) by any better information structure if and only if j1(α1,πy)
is convex (resp. concave) in πy.
This Lemma states that the convexity of slope of the value function with respect to α1 is
necessary and sufﬁcient to control the comparative statics of more information. Sufﬁciency
is obvious given the inequalities above. Necessity means that if the slope of the value
function is neither concave nor convex in posterior probabilities, then it is always possible
to ﬁnd well-chosen information structures so that α1 may both increase or decrease with a
better information structure.11
However, despite its high degree of generality, this Lemma is difﬁcult to understand and,
inparticular,itishardtoconnectittotheprimitivesofthemodel(4).Thisisthatconnection
that we are going to investigate now.
4.2. The ‘irreversibility effect’
We will now use the previous Lemma to examine the interplay between information and
irreversibility. Before, let us recall the example introduced in Section 3.1. Using Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)’s parameters values, we showed a situation where no information led to
investing in the ﬁrst period α∗ 
1 = 1 while perfect information led to delay the investment88 GOLLIER AND TREICH
decision α∗
1 = 0. The basic insight is that the prospect to receive information in the future
leads to adopt a more ﬂexible position today. The intuitive reasoning is clear: choosing
an inﬂexible position undermines the value of information. Hence, as the informativeness
increases, the incentive to remain ﬂexible and take advantage of it also increases.
Let us now generalize this example to derive a formal statement of this so-called “irre-
versibility effect”, as it has been ﬁrst formalized by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry
(1974a, 1974b). To keep the model simple, we assume that
D = [0,1] and D(α1) = [0,1 − α1]. (13)
Unambiguously, lowering α1 increases ﬂexibility for the future. A simple application of
this model is for a non-renewable resource of size 1 that can be consumed over two periods.
Future proﬁts associated to resource consumption are assumed to be uncertain in the future,
due to the social cost it generates in terms of biodiversity for instance.
Importantly, although we will generalize the Dixit and Pindyck’s model to introduce
risk aversion and partial resolution of uncertainty, we still assume that future utility do not
depend directly on previous actions (recall Eq. (6))
v(α1,α 2,θ) ≡ v(α2,θ). (14)
Yet, current actions may affect future utility indirectly through the impact on the future
opportunity set.
Let us solve this problem. Let α∗
2(y) the solution when the constraint α2 ≤ 1 − α1 is not
binding, i.e.
E ˜ θ/yv2(α∗
2(y), ˜ θ) = 0.




2(y), ˜ θ)i f E ˜ θ/yv2(1 − α1, ˜ θ) ≤ 0
E ˜ θ/yv(1 − α1, ˜ θ) otherwise.
From Deﬁnition 1, we know that this function is convex in πy. Let us now differentiate with
respect to α1 so that we get
j1(α1,πy) =
 
0i f E ˜ θ/yv2(1 − α1, ˜ θ) ≤ 0
−E ˜ θ/yv2(1 − α1, ˜ θ) otherwise,
or, equivalently,
j1(α1,πy) =−max(0, E ˜ θ/yv2(1 − α1, ˜ θ)).
Since E ˜ θ/yv2(1−α1, ˜ θ) is linear in πy and max is a convex operator, j1(α1,πy) is concave
in πy. Lemma 1 implies that the optimal α1 decreases with better information. Since de-
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of informativeness biases ex ante decisions in favor of more ﬂexibility. This is in the spirit
of the PP. The prospect to receive information is an argument to reduce irreversibility. In
the following Proposition, scientiﬁc uncertainty means a more informative structure.
Proposition 1. In problem (4) with (14) and (13), scientiﬁc uncertainty leads to preserve
more ﬂexibility for the future.
We conclude that the notion of option value that sustained the PP in the example of
Section3.1canbegeneralizedinseveraldirections:partialresolutionofuncertainty,relative
ﬂexibility, continuous decision variables and risk aversion. However, several authors have
pointed out that the ‘irreversibility effect’ holds in rather special models (see e.g. Freixas
and Laffont, 1984; Graham-Tomasi, 1995). For example models such as growth models do
not satisfy restriction (14) since today’s output realization affect directly future welfare. In
mostcases,futureutilityv(α1,α 2,θ)doesdependonα1.Thenextsectionexamineswhether
the ‘irreversibility effect’ may carry over to a broader class models. An important question
is to determine the optimal timing of prevention efforts when current actions affect the risk
borne by future generations. This is typically the case when there are stock externalities.
4.3. The ‘precautionary effect’
ThereisanimportantliteraturesinceKeeler,Spence,andZeckhauser(1971)ontheoptimal
growth in the presence of environmental externalities, particularly stock externalities. Con-
sumption accumulates in some medium (water, soil, air, body...) and may have harmful
effectsinthefuture.Wenowexaminetheeffectofbetterinformationinaverysimplemodel
where there is a risk of consumption externality. We will exhibit the conditions so that the
presence of scientiﬁc uncertainty about this risk leads to more precaution today.
The model work as follows. We assume that the only source of utility comes from the
consumption αt of a good in each period t. The good is free but its consumption may turn
out to be toxic in the future. The damage representing this toxicity is measured in terms of
ﬁnal consumption and is supported only in the second period. This damage is proportional
to the quantity of the good already consumed C ≡ δα1 + α2 so that we get
v(α1,α 2,θ) ≡ v(α2 − θ(δα1 + α2)). (15)
Parameter δ denotes the fraction of the good consumed in the ﬁrst period which remains
toxic in the second period. This parameter depicts the stock externality. When δ = 0,
restriction (14) applies.
The extent of the damage is unknown at the beginning of the ﬁrst period. This is rep-
resented by the random variable ˜ θ. Experiments ˜ y will allow the consumer to revise the








E ˜ θ|˜ y v(α2 − ˜ θ(δα1 + α2))
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As before, our aim is to examine the effect of scientiﬁc uncertainty on the initial efﬁcient
decision. To keep this analysis simple, we assume that u is increasing and concave and











Some restrictions on the parameters are required to make v(·) increasing and concave in its
domain {x ∈ R | η + x/γ > 0}.12
Let us now solve this problem. It is easy to check that if v(·)i sd e ﬁned as in (17), then the
optimal stock of consumption C∗ = δα1 + α∗
2 is proportional to η − δ
α1
γ . More precisely,
we obtain C∗(α1,πy) = c∗(πy)(η − δ
α1
γ ), with c∗(πy)d e ﬁned by E˜ z(1 +
c∗(πy)˜ z
γ )−γ = 0.
As a result future consumption is linear in η − δ
α1










with g(πy) = E(1 +
c∗(πy)˜ z
γ )1−γ.B yD e ﬁnition 1, we know that j is convex in πy. Thus, g










We conclude that j1 is concave in πy if and only if γ is strictly positive and less than unity.
Lemma 1 then concludes the comparative statics analysis. We thus derive the following
proposition due to Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) in which the level of precaution
means the level of consumption of the polluting good in period 1.
Proposition 2. Consider the decision problem (16) with (17). Scientiﬁc uncertainty in-
creases the efﬁcient level of precaution if and only if 0 <γ<1. In the case with γ → 1,
i.e. v(x) = ln(η+x), scientiﬁc uncertainty has no effect on the efﬁcient level of precaution.
This proposition describes the circumstances where the prospect to receive information
in the future induces the consumer to reduce the consumption of the toxic product. This in
turn gives a normative support to the PP in the presence of stock externalities.
Two opposite effects take place in this analysis. On the one hand, a better information
structure leads the DM to behave in a more efﬁcient way in the future because of the better
knowledge of the risk. If we interpret an improvement in efﬁciency as a sure increase in
future incomes, this implies that the agent will want to consume more today, as he wants to
smooth consumption over time. This effect goes the opposite direction to the one suggested
bythePP.However,ontheotherhand,betterinformationleadstoamean-preservingspread
of posterior beliefs (recall Deﬁnition 1). This makes future payoffs more variable since the
futuredecisionvariesforeveryposteriorbelief.AprudentconsumermaythenreduceinitialDECISION-MAKING UNDER SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 91
consumption for a precautionary motive. For the special case of HARA utility functions,
we have shown that this last effect dominates when 0 <γ<1.13
This shows that the PP cannot be justiﬁed independently of the preferences of the DM
when the important aspect of the question is a stock externality rather than an irreversibility
constraint. This raises the issue of the choice of preferences and of the type of DM which
is considered. This also leads to inquire about the importance of speciﬁcation (15) in the
previous analysis. Basically that speciﬁcation meant that damages could be evaluated in
monetary terms. Assume now instead that damages are intangible and take the following
form
v(α1,α 2,θ) ≡ v(α2) − θS(δα1 + α2), (20)
where S(C) denotes the impact on future utility of previous consumption C. Using speciﬁ-
cation (20), Ulph and Ulph (1997) showed that the result is in general ambiguous. They so
took quadratic functional forms for v(·) and S(·) and showed that the PP is never justiﬁed
in this situation.
Another important speciﬁcation in model (16) is that we have implicitly assumed D =
D(α1) =  . There is no irreversibility constraint. What would happen if we extend model
(16) by incorporating an irreversibility constraint? Ulph and Ulph (1997) and Gollier et al.
(2000) examined the interplay between irreversibility and stock externalities. They consid-
ered a constraint of type α2 ≥ kα1. E.g., in a model of global warming, when k = 0, this
meansthatemissionsinperiod2cannotbenegative.Itisnotpossibletoremovegreenhouse
gases from the atmosphere. These two papers showed that such an irreversibility constraint
always require lower current consumption. Gollier et al. (2000) also showed that the ‘irre-
versibilityeffect’alwayscombineswiththe‘precautionaryeffect’towardsmoreprecaution
today when more precaution was already sustained in the model without the irreversibility
constraint.
Interestingly Kolstad (1996) introduced the symmetrical constraint, i.e. a constraint of
type α2 ≤ mα1. In his model of global warming, this constraint means that next-period
controlled emissions should be at least as large as current-period controlled emissions (up
to a factor m). This represents irreversibility of capital investment in control measures:
emissions cannot go too high because of previous investment in capital abatement. Kolstad
(1996) showed that this type of constraint may make precautionary policies non-optimal.
Irreversibility of capital may dominate environmental irreversibility.14
In summary, we have mentioned three sources of inertia in our model of pollution ex-
ternality. First, stock externality, δ>0: pollution accumulates and it is not possible to
reduce this stock more than the natural rate of decay δ. Second, environmental irreversibil-
ity, α2 ≥ kα1: if one emits pollution one cannot retrieve the initial state of the environment.
Third, capital irreversibility, α2 ≤ mα1: if one invests in pollution control, one cannot
immediately reduce the abatement capital stock.
An interesting problem is to determine the dominant effect. We have shown that the ﬁrst
effect, due to stock externality, may be broken down into two basic effects of opposite sign.
Its global sign depends upon the speciﬁcation of the DM’s preferences. We have also said
that the second and third ones have clear-cut but opposite directions. As a result, there is no
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opposite directions. This ambiguity has also been demonstrated in empirical works on the
effect of scientiﬁc uncertainty on the climate policy, as in Nordhaus (1994) and Ha-Duong
(1998).
5. Decentralized decision-making under scientiﬁc uncertainty
In the previous section, we have analyzed the changes that scientiﬁc uncertainty brings to
the optimal timing of prevention efforts. We have shown that it may support the adoption of
the Precautionary Principle as a socially efﬁcient guideline. Instrumental to the reasoning
is that information has a positive value and that it increases the incentives to remain ﬂexible
(Proposition 1) and to reduce current risk-exposure (Proposition 2). To derive these results,
we have considered a class of problems where there is one single DM. However, in market
situations, there is not one single DM but multiple DMs who act in a decentralized way.
We will show in this section that market forces often do not sustain the implementation
of precautionary policies. More precisely, we will show that, even when precautionary
policies should be adopted in the global economy, these policies may not be selected at the
equilibrium of the economy. The PP may then be viewed as an incentive or constraint for
the DMs to select even so precautionary policies.
5.1. Competition and innovations
A typical difﬁculty of a decentralization process comes from the incentive of competitive
ﬁrmstoinvesttooearly,asexplainedforexamplebyWeeds(1999)forthemarketofinnova-
tions.Thereasonisthatmostinnovationsarenon-proprietaryinvestmentopportunities.Not
all markets are indeed such that legally enforceable property rights (like patents) confers a
ﬁrm the right to possess the innovation. As a result, several ﬁrms may face in the same time
a similar investment opportunity. There thus is a possibility for every ﬁrm that another ﬁrm
introduces the same innovation earlier and takes most of the rent from it. This possibility
of being preempted undermines the option value of waiting for introducing the innovation,
as we will now show.
To keep the argument simple, let us use the simple two-period model presented in
Section 3.1. We hereafter assume that n risk neutral ﬁrms compete for the introduction
of an innovation whose expected value is P per period. Because of the ﬁxed sunk cost I
to initiate production, there is increasing return to scale and only one ﬁrm will invest at
equilibrium. The natural monopoly extracts all the surplus at equilibrium.
As before, at the end of the ﬁrst period, everybody will learn whether the value of the
innovation is 0.5P or 1.5P for the future. We have seen in Section 3.1 that it is socially
efﬁcient to wait for this information to come before deciding whether to introduce the
innovation or not if NPV2 is larger than NPV1. It is interesting to see whether competitive
ﬁrms follow this rule or not.
Toanswerthisquestion,letussolvethisproblembybackwardinduction.Supposethatall
ﬁrms decide to delay the introduction of their investment up to the date where the scientiﬁc
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no ﬁrm is willing to introduce the innovation, under condition (2). Suppose alternatively
that a high value of the innovation is revealed. In that case, the monopoly discounted proﬁt
1.5P(1 − β)−1 − I is positive, and each ﬁrm is willing to take the market before the other
ﬁrms. Suppose that each ﬁrm has an equal probability to act ﬁrst and to get the monopoly
rent. This lottery can come from the uncertainty about which ﬁrm will get the information a
bit earlier about the quality of the innovation. As seen from the ﬁrst period, the net present
expected proﬁt for each ﬁrm is NPV2/n. This is the value of a ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period if they
all decide to delay the introduction of the innovation.
Let us now look at the decision of the ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period. Under which condition is it
an equilibrium for the ﬁrms to postpone their investment? Because the net present expected
value of the investment is NPV1 for the ﬁrm which gets the market, the decision not to
introduce the innovation in the initial period if no other ﬁrm did introduce it before is an
optimal decision if NPV1 is smaller than NPV2/n. Thus, delaying the introduction of the
innovation in the ﬁrst period is an equilibrium only when NPV1 is smaller than NPV2/n,
which tends to zero has n tends to inﬁnity. This means that in a competitive economy,
all innovations are introduced as soon as their net present expected value is nonnegative.
Competitive ﬁrms do not use the option value to wait, because the risk would be too large
to be preempted by other ﬁrms. This implies that innovations are introduced too early in
competitive economies.
5.2. Time-inconsistencies
In the previous model, we have shown that competition could induce DMs to invest too
early. We will now investigate another reason for why the timing of decisions might be
sub-optimal. It is based on the conﬂict between the current DM and the future DMs, the
so-called time-inconsistency problem.
Time-inconsistency is traditionally associated to the process of procrastination (Akerlof,
1991). This process is well-known: from my point of view it may be optimal to “smoke
today” and to “stop smoking” tomorrow. But when tomorrow comes, the trade-off is the
same as today and I decide to continue to “smoke today”, delaying one day further the
decision to “stop smoking”.
Withthisdailylifeexampleinmind,itsurelyrequiresnoalgebratounderstandwhytime-





Current DMs wait when they should act. This effect is not compatible with the PP since
our interpretation of the PP is based on an efﬁcient procrastination process. Furthermore,
time-inconsistency may lead conversely to a process of inefﬁcient rush. Current DMs may
act when they should wait.
To see that, consider again the two-period model presented in Section 3.1. Yet, imagine
now a situation where the implementation of the project is left to the government in power.
Thereisonegovernmentineachperiod,andofcoursetheprojectcanbeapprovedonlyonce.94 GOLLIER AND TREICH
In addition, assume that if one of the two governments approves the project, it receives an
extra-gratiﬁcation g > 0. This is prestige for government bodies for example. Importantly,
g does not have any social value, nor any value for the government that has not adopted the
project. As a result, there is a “bias for the present” (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) in that
economy since both governments prefer the project to be adopted when they are in power.
This bias may generate a time-inconsistent decision rule, as we will now show.
For government-1, undertaking the project yields net present value NPV1 + g = P(1 −
β)−1 − I + g. Assume that
1.5P(1 − β)−1 − I + g ≥ 0 ≥ 0.5P(1 − β)−1 − I + g, (21)
so that, this is only when the good scientiﬁc theory is true that government-2 will approve
theproject.Inthatcase,government-1’snetpresentvalueofdelayingtheprojectuntildate2
is the same as before NPV2 = 0.5β[1.5P(1 − β)−1 − I]. But it may be that
NPV1 + g > NPV2 > NPV1, (22)
so that, as in the previous section, the decentralized decision’s rule is to invest in period 1,
while the socially optimal decision’s rule is to delay the adoption of the project until
period 2 (since NPV2 >NPV1). More surprisingly, note that there exist some values of
the parameters so that (21) and (22) hold together with NPV1 + g < 0.15 In that case,
government-1wouldevenrushonaprojectwithanegativenetpresentvalueforitself.16 This
is because it anticipates that, if the good scientiﬁc theory turns out to be true, government-2
wouldadoptaprojectwithanegativenetpresentvalue(sinceinthatcasewehave1.5P(1−
β)−1 − I < 0).
5.3. Global pollution
Another typical problem is the global aspects of some externalities. When pollution is a
public good, no one would want to pay the cost of reducing pollution alone. This raises the
familiar free-riding problem. In this section, we show an example where this problem is
getting worse in the presence of scientiﬁc progress.
Consider the general model (4). Interpret it as a model of global warming. Yet, assume
that there are two DMs, say two countries i = A, B, and that the damages depend on the
total emissions of both countries. As before, damages only occur in period 2.
Each country chooses the level of emission in each period, αi
t. Assume that the utility of











2 denote total emissions. Parameter θi indicates the extent
of the damage in country i. Future damages are unknown in period 1. The structure of
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• With probability π, damages will occur in country A:(˜ θ A, ˜ θ B) = (θ,0) where θ>0.
• With probability 1 − π, they will occur in country B:(˜ θ A, ˜ θ B) = (0,θ).
The decision about αi
2 is taken before observing which country incurs the damage, but
after observing some signal correlated to π.
To solve the model, we follow Ulph and Maddison (1997). They consider quadratic
functional forms,
u(x) =− 0.5(η − x)2, and S(C) = 0.5C2. (23)
These assumptions enable us to get closed-form solutions for the Nash equilibrium of this
game. Optimal level of emissions in period 2 as a function of πare
αA
2 (π) =




η(1 − θ + 2πθ) − (1 − π)cθ
1 + θ
,
where c = δαA
1 + δαB
1 . Using these solutions, it is straightforward to compute the value
functions for both countries as a function of π. We obtain
jA(π) =−
π(2η + c)2θ(1 + πθ)
2(1 + θ)2
jB(π) =−
(1 − π)(2η + c)2θ(1 + (1 − π)θ)
2(1 + θ)2 .
Observe that j 
A(π) < 0 and that j 
B(π) > 0. An increase in the probability to have its own
country incurring the damage reduces one’s own expected utility at the equilibrium.
We want to compare the welfare at the non-cooperative equilibrium of the economy
jnc(π) = 0.5jA(π) + 0.5jB(π),
to the one reached at the cooperative equilibrium, denoted jc(π). In fact, since the damage
















which does not depend on π. Let us compute the cost due to non-cooperation C(π) in that
economy. It is simply given by C(π) = jc − jnc(π), so that
C  (π) =
(2η + c)2θ2
(1 + θ)2 > 0.
Hence, this cost is a convex function in posterior beliefs. According to Deﬁnition 1
in Section 3.2, this means that it increases with a better information structure. As a result,
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because scientiﬁc progress reveals the asymmetric consequences of the game. This resem-
bles an “Hirshleifer effect” (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). When one ignores which country
will be affected, the two countries may ﬁnd a mutual advantage in reducing emissions. Yet
if information is revealed early, it may destroy risk-sharing opportunities. Note also, that, in
the period 1 of this game, the incentives to cooperate for the two countries are thus stronger
when scientiﬁc progress is expected over time.17
6. Discussion
Our objective in this section is to relate our economic interpretation of the PP to some
policy-oriented issues.
First of all, it is important to recognize that other interpretations of the PP can be found,
in particular the one based on ambiguity aversion in a static framework. In our approach,
we have emphasized above all the role played by scientiﬁc progress within the process of
decision-making. This is because we consider that the concept of precaution only refers to
situations where the knowledge of the risk evolves over time. This idea related the presence
ofscientiﬁcuncertaintyisreallythenovelideathatbroughtthePrincipleintoriskregulatory
decision-making. This is why we think that it is important, as a ﬁrst step, to clearly separate
the discussion on the effect of scientiﬁc uncertainty on risk management from extended
topics on the regulation of externalities (Polluter-pays Principle) or on intergenerational
equity (Sustainable Development Principle).
AsanillustrationofourinterpretationofthePP,considertheKyotoProtocol.Intheglobal
warming issue, uncertainty are pervasive and implicit in the problem about controlling
emissions is how fast this uncertainty will resolve over time. In relation to that question, the
response of the Kyoto Protocol has been to set near-term reduction objectives together with
introducing a large degree of ﬂexibility for the implementation of future commitments. The
Protocol speciﬁes limiting emission levels rather than specifying long-term concentration
targets. This will permit to adapt the strength of abatement efforts to evolving scientiﬁc
knowledge. In addition, the Protocol incorporates several dimensions of ﬂexibility, e.g. the
Protocol is deﬁned in terms of a basket of several greenhouse gases and it allows several
regulatory instruments: joint implementation, clean development mechanism and emission
trading (see e.g. Grubb, 2000).
Yet,ofcourse,therearemanyreasonsforwhythetimingoftheclimatepolicymaynotac-
count appropriately for the dynamics of uncertainty resolution. Section 5 has presented two
of these reasons. One is because the global warming issue is a global problem. Suppose that
scientiﬁc information reveals that the risk of climate change is less important in some spe-
ciﬁc country than in other countries. Then there are incentives for this country to free-ride
over other countries’ reductions in emissions. Another reason is time-inconsistency. There
are incentives for governments to refuse to abate emissions of CO2 at a level announced
by former governments. A natural response to these problems is to design institutions and
policyarchitecturestohelptheenforcementofabatementpolicies(Shmalensee,1998).The
PP may be used to facilitate this process. In particular, the PP could be invoked when a
government refuse to cooperate, acknowledging that the problem is “too uncertain” to set
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The implications of the PP are not limited to environmental protection policy. The PP
is now getting a prominent role in health and safety debates. The ’mad cow’ affair in
Europe has been the ﬁrst popular illustration of the idea of precaution. Current debates
over transgenic food is another important illustration. What can say the economic approach
about current health and safety policy debates? To start with, it may be useful to come back
to model (16). Interpret it as a model of an individual consumer getting utility from eating
a speciﬁc product. As before, there is a risk that this food will be toxic in the future. Yet
improvements in scientiﬁc knowledge will reveal whether this is a case or not. In such a
situation, Proposition 2 tells us that the existence of the “precautionary effect” in the short
run critically depends on the shape of the preferences of the consumer. A straightforward
conclusionisthatthiseffectmayexistforsomeconsumersandnotforothers.Consequently,
a precautionary measure such as banning the food is inefﬁcient, as it gives no choice to
consumers.18 In the domain of food safety, the PP thus merely requires that consumers
know, via product warnings or labellings, the risk they face. No direct public intervention
is really necessary.
Infact,suchabasicviewinfavorofnointerventionisprobablyincorrectunderconditions
of high scientiﬁc uncertainty. A simple reason for that is that consumers often misperceive
the risks they face (Viscusi, 1998). There is a very well documented in psychology on that
issue. Individuals have problems with the mathematics of probability, they use rules of
thumbs or heuristics that are useful but misleading. In addition, the presence of scientiﬁc
uncertaintylikelyexacerbatesconsumersmisperceptions,sothattheirconsumptionchoices
may deviate signiﬁcantly from optimal ones. In the presence of high scientiﬁc uncertainty,
there is likely a role for government intervention.19




normative support to such an observed behavior. In particular, this behavior is inconsistent
with the Bayesian updating of uncertain beliefs over time. It may thus lead to some bias in
individualssequentialchoices,likeoverreactionstohighlypublicizedrisks(Viscusi,1997).
Again, this may be in favor of some public intervention to correct the biases.
Also,thereistheimportantissueofinformationaggregationandinformationcommunica-
tion. Needless to say, scientiﬁc uncertainty complicates risk assessment and risk communi-
cation procedures. How to compare different experts conclusions? How can policy-makers
deliver the message to the public that two scientiﬁc theories are contradictory? In some
complex situations, it may be better to develop simple command-and-control measures
than displaying complex information to consumers. Furthermore, it is important to account
that experts may be self-interested as well. They may be sensitive to some ﬁnancing pro-
vided some lobby involved in the matter or to some reputation effects. Under conditions of
large scientiﬁc uncertainty, experts may then provide more easily biased policy recommen-
dations. Policy-makers may, in turn, rely more easily on the scientiﬁc theory that matches
their objective.
This last remark gives rise to another issue, related to the effect of scientiﬁc uncertainty
in risk politics. Scientiﬁc uncertainty may for example generate a typical phenomenon of98 GOLLIER AND TREICH
political demagogy. Indeed, given the complexity of the underlying scientiﬁc problems,
the public is in general less informed than politicians about some particular danger. Then,
politicians with strong career concerns may prefer to select the risk policy that the public
believes is good rather than the one which is actually good for the public. This is true in
particular when long term risks, i.e., risks whose outcome will be observed in a distant
future. As a result, the inﬂuence of politics together with imperfect knowledge of the risk
by the public will cause the regulator to depart from social welfare maximization. Maskin
and Tirole (2000) have a model describing such a source of political inefﬁciency.
How to reduce political opportunism? One may investigate ways to modify the Consti-
tution in order to generate better incentives in risk regulatory decision-making. From this
point of view, it is often said that the PP may change the rule of the game in risk politics.
Indeed, it may help to make politicians aware of their responsibilities for decisions taken
under large conditions of uncertainty. In France for instance, in April 1993, the Conseil
d’Etat gave a warning of caution to politicians: “In a situation of risk, one non-validated
hypothesis should be taken as temporary true, even if it is not formally demonstrated.” A
few years after this caution, several French ministers have been judged for their respective
liabilities in the contaminated blood affair.
In the same vein, it makes sense to think that the PP will increase the liability of ﬁrms
under conditions of scientiﬁc uncertainty. Think of the example presented in Section 5.1. In
thatexample,ﬁrmsintroduceinnovationstooearly,i.e.beforelearningwhetherintroducing
the risky innovation is socially desirable or not. In this situation, the question is to design
the PP so that it introduces a constraint for ﬁrms to include the value of future information
generated by scientiﬁc progress in their decision process. Using the PP, an entrepreneur
may for instance be blamed because he has not sufﬁciently tested a product that turned
out to be toxic. This may lead ﬁrms to better internalize for the damages they generate to
society. But this may not be enough to guarantee that ﬁrms implement an efﬁcient level of
precaution. Indeed the damages may occur far in the future so that the ﬁrm may no longer
exist at that date, as it was the case in the abestos industry for example. Also, it raises the
issue of the potential bankruptcy of the ﬁrms, which gives rise to an ex post problem of
victim compensation and to an ex ante problem of under prevention by injurers.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the discussions on the design of risk regulatory
policiesdonotonlyconcernexperts,politiciansorentrepreneurs.Theymustalsoaccountfor
the acceptability of the policies by the public. Increasingly, the public is aware of the limits
ofscientiﬁcknowledge.Policy-makersmayhavelostlegitimacyintheeyesoflaypeople.In
Europe, the failures of risk regulatory institutions in the past decades has drastically reduce
citizens’trustinthem.Theyhaveputintoquestionthestandardchannelsofdecision-making,
based on an elite which makes decision, without any real public consultation.
As a ﬁnal word, let us recall that the PP may have many drawbacks as well. If it is
interpreted in a too extreme way, the PP may inhibit economic development in our society
(Gollier, 2001). It may lead to delay innovations that are safe and effective. It may be used
to set up high safety domestic standards in order to develop protective measures. A broad
discussiononthePPshouldalsorecognizethattoomucheffortisspentonnewlydiscovered
risks compared with familiar risks (Viscusi, 1998). There is thus a need to re-think usual
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7. Conclusion
The PP has deﬁned a new standard of risk management when the very existence of the
risk is subject to scientiﬁc controversies. It provides the foundations for building a new
risk regulatory pattern under conditions of scientiﬁc uncertainty. However the common
formulation of the Precautionary Principle (PP) has no practical content and offers little
guidanceforconceivingregulatorypolicies.Itwassaidrecentlythat“nogeneralagreement
exists on what the PP means in different socioeconomic and cultural systems” (Report of
the Conference on Science and The Precautionary Principle, 2000).
In this paper, we have presented our economic interpretation of the PP. Let us sum up the
main points of the analysis.
• Our framework for deﬁning the optimal regulatory policy is based on a cost-beneﬁt anal-
ysis. There is scientiﬁc uncertainty either on the costs or on the beneﬁts of the policy.
We assume that new scientiﬁc knowledge may arrive over time, thus resolving current
uncertainties.Asaresult,theanalysisshouldbedifferentfromstandardcost-beneﬁtanal-
ysis.Withinanexpectedutility/Bayesianframework,weexaminethefollowingquestion:
Under which conditions should the prospect of obtaining better scientiﬁc information in
the future lead to a more precautionary policy today?
• Oneconditionisthatthepolicyleadsreducethedegreeofirreversibilityforfuturechoices.
Forinstance,apolicythatleadstopreserveawildlandareaismorevaluableifoneexpects
to obtain better information over time. Indeed, it leaves the option of reconsidering the
development decision later on. More generally, the prospect of increasing information
over time biases decisions in favor of more ﬂexibility. This well-known “irreversibility
effect” (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974) justiﬁes the PP when preserving the
environment leaves more ﬂexibility for future choices.
• However, the irreversible nature of our decisions is only one element entering the picture
of risk policies. Generally, today’s actions affect future welfare, not only through a re-
duction of the future set of choices, but also directly by changing the risk borne by future
generations. Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) consider a model where more consump-
tion today increases the risk borne in the future. They show that scientiﬁc uncertainty
leads to decrease current consumption. This “precautionary effect” takes place under a
restrictive but plausible condition on the degree of risk-aversion of the consumer. Thus,
togetherwiththepure“irreversibilityeffect”,the“precautionaryeffect”providesastrong
normative basis to the PP.
• Another issue is that precautionary policies may not be selected at the equilibrium of the
economy, even when it would be globally optimal to do so. This is typically the case in
sectors where high proﬁts are promised for the industries able to preempt the market.
As a result, competitive ﬁrms may not use the option value to wait and may introduce
innovationstooearly.ThePPmaythenbeviewedasanincentiveoraconstrainttoinclude
the value of information generated by future scientiﬁc progress on the optimal decision
process of the ﬁrms. Other concerns such as free-riding or time-inconsistencies have also
been discussed.
• Finally, the presence of scientiﬁc uncertainty may favor, through the multiple chan-
nels of decision-making, opportunistic behaviors. Indeed, scientiﬁc uncertainty opens100 GOLLIER AND TREICH
a considerable room for discretion and for self-interested biases. Several social actors
(entrepreneurs, lobbies, experts, politicians...) may use the argument of the lack of sci-
entiﬁc evidence to push the ﬁnal decision toward their own interest. The problem then
consists in determining the right mechanism to force the various social actors to partic-
ipate efﬁciently to the process of regulatory decision-making. The PP, by increasing the
liability of these actors, may be viewed as a safe-guard against opportunistic behaviors
in situations of asymmetric information or imperfect monitoring. Yet, examining these
questions needs a broader reﬂection on the channels and on the institutions of risk man-
agement. This was not the purpose of the present paper. This leaves open an interesting
domain for future research in information economics and law and political economy.
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Notes
1. Sandin (1999) catalogues 19 different interpretations.
2. For various interpretations, see for example Cameron and O’Riordan (1994) or the Report of the Conference
on Science and The Precautionary Principle (2000).
3. Related discussions on this approach may be found in Farrow (2001), Graham (2001) and Treich (2001). A
growing number of theoretical papers has also been written recently on this topic. See for example a recent
conference in Environmental Economics at Wageningen (Proceedings, 2002).
4. Equivalent deﬁnitions have been enacted in many international conventions such as recently for the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted in january 2000 . In national law,
similardeﬁnitionsexistaswell.Forinstance,intheFrenchlaw,thePPisdeﬁnedasaclauseoftheLoiBarnier
in 1995 on the reinforcement of the protection of the environment. It states that “the absence of certainty,
given our current scientiﬁc knowledge, should not delay the use of measures preventing a risk of large and
irreversible damages to the environment, at an acceptable cost.”
5. Weassumethattherevelationofthetruetheorycomesfrompurescientiﬁcresearch,notfromexperimentation.
Thisisduetothelongdelayoccuringbetweenconsumptionordevelopmentandtheobservationoftheadverse
effects. This may be unrealistic in some cases. For instance early phasing out of ozone depleting substances
has certainly slow down the knowledge of the destructive effects of CFCs. It has also boosted chemical
research. The reader may ﬁnd in Fisher and Hanneman (1987), Orphanides and Zervos (1995) and Datta,
Mirman, and Schlee (1998) some theoretical insights on this so-called experimentation effect. Note that there
is no discussion either on the way the choice is made among various scientiﬁc experiments. In our model,
informationisfreeandwedonotdirectlypayattentiontotheprocessthatdrivestheproductionofinformation.
As a consequence, our framework does not permit to explore the interplay between the PP and the economics
of invention and research (see e.g. Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992).
6. See also more recently Bernanke (1983), McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Drazen and Sakellaris (1996).
7. Even if the utility functions u and v are concave in the choice variables, unicity of solutions is not guaranteed
for any set D(α1).
8. It is important to notice that deﬁnition (8) implies that the cost of moving from α1 to α2 inside the opportunity
set D(α1) is zero while the cost of moving outside the opportunity set is inﬁnite. From this point of view,
one could argue that irreversibility is not well deﬁned economically. Jones and Ostroy (1984) relax these
assumptions and refer to the broader notion of adjustment cost.DECISION-MAKING UNDER SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 101
9. A careful examination of the different effect of upward and downward irreversibilities is developed in Viscusi
(1984).
10. See e.g. Shannon (1948).
11. More on this point may be found in Fisher, Hanemann, and Narain (2002).
12. HARAutilityfunctionscorrespondstothesetoffunctionswhoseabsoluterisktoleranceislinearin x.Indeed,
wecaneasilyverifythat−v (x)/v  (x) = η+ x
γ .Ifη = 0,wegetthestandardConstantRelativeRiskAversion
(CRRA) functions, with constant relative risk aversion γ. We get Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)
functions if γ tends to inﬁnity.
13. This result may sound strange at ﬁrst since a lower risk aversion γ should rather lead to reduce risk-exposure.
However Gollier et al. (2000) proved that the result depends in fact on an whether the coefﬁcient of prudence
(Kimball, 1990) is larger than twice the coefﬁcient of risk-aversion. This is thus only for the special class of
HARA utility functions that this condition implies that more risk-averse agents take more risk in the initial
period.
14. The model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) presented above could easily be adapted and reinterpreted as a model
of investment in pollution control, leading to that conclusion.
15. Take for example I = 2P(1 − β)−1 and g ∈ [(1 − 0.25β)P(1 − β)−1, P(1 − β)−1].
16. See Brocas and Carrillo (2001) for a thourough analysis.
17. Several working papers presented at a recent conference investigate this question (Proceedings, 2002). More-
over, it is noticeable that Ulph and Ulph (1996) examined numerically in this game the effect of learning on
ﬁrst period global emissions. They showed that this effect can go either way.
18. ThisproblemhasbeenrecognizedbyR.ColemaninarecentcommunicationonthePP(Coleman,2002).“My
department is constantly faced with the challenge of balancing the freedom and rights of individuals, industry
and organizations with the need to reduce the real and potential adverse effects of products and processes on
human, animal or plant-health or the environment.”
19. Salani´ e and Treich (2002) examine the interaction between regulation and private consumption choices when
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